Abstract-Homomorphic message authentication codes (MAC) have been proposed to thwart pollution attacks in network coding. The existing schemes mainly are based on the vector inner product or trace function over finite fields. Recently, Wang and Hu presented a generic construction of homomorphic MAC scheme based on linear mapping over finite fields which is an excellent abstract of the vector inner product and the trace function. However, their construction can only be used for single-file transmission. In this paper, we convert their scheme into a new one that supports multi-file transmission. Moreover, our scheme needs shorter key when one wants to achieve the same security as that of Wang et al.
vector to be authenticated and another one is the key, to construct their homomorphic MAC and the resulting tag is a single element of F q , which means that any adversary may break the MAC by randomly guessing a value in F q as the tag. However, just as Agrawal et al. said in [6] , usually, the predetermined parameter q is typically set as 8 2 256.  Hence, this security level may not be sufficient. Two "trivial" methods are suggested to enhance the security. One is simply to increase q , i.e. the size of the underlying field, which may cause additional computational and communication overheads, and another one is computing multiple MACs per vector, which may need longer keys [6] .
To solve the above problem, Cheng and Jiang [8] employed the trace function over finite fields to construct a homomorphic MAC achieving a reliable security 1/ l q , where l is a proper parameter chosen according to the different requirement of security, neither increasing the size of the field nor employing longer keys.
In fact, from the algebra point of view, both the innerproduct operation and the trace function can be viewed as special cases of the linear mapping over finite fields. More recently, Wang and Hu [9] proposed a generic/universal construction of homomorphic MAC based on the linear mapping. Therefore, all existing schemes based on inner-product or trace function are essentially special cases of their scheme. Moreover, their construction not only achieves the functionality of authentication but also has greater flexibility and effectiveness for multi-tag cases. In particular, based on their linear mapping-technique, Wang and Hu analyzed the MAC scheme used in the transmission protocol RIPPLE [10, 11] and shortened the length of its keys.
Revisiting the excellent construction in [9] , we find that their scheme only considered the single-file distribution (i.e. the packets (or vectors) transmitted among the nodes must belong to one file (or linear space)). However, in this situation, the corresponding homomorphic MAC scheme is susceptible to repetitive attacks [12] .
In this paper, inspired by the technique proposed in [6] , we convert the construction of Wang and Hu into a new one which supports multi-file transmission and hence resists foregoing repetitive attacks. Now, we briefly introduce our idea as follows. In [9] , a tag for some vector v consists of a new vector obtained by acting a linear transformation (essentially indexed by the secret key) on v . Since they only considered the single-file case, their MAC scheme has a simpler form. However, in order to obtain schemes supporting multi-file case, we also need to "add" the information of filename into the tag. Therefore, based on the scheme of Wang et al., we additionally "mask" the tag using a pseudo random function (PRF) of the filename. By virtue of the use of PRF, we find that our construction can achieve the same level of security as in [9] but only need much shorter key. Or equivalently, we can achieve higher level of security using (almost) the same length of key as in [9] .
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Basic Notation.
For any finite set X, the notion $ xX  means choosing an element x from X uniformly at random. 
B. Network Coding
We briefly recall the model of linear networking coding [1] . When transmitting a file, the source node first breaks it into a sequence of vectors 12 
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Game is identical to 0 Game except that the challenger replaces the output of the PRG G by a truly random matrix. That is, he chooses ' $ ( , )
 in the MAC algorithm and everything else remains the same. Then a straightforward reduction to the property of PRG yields a PRG adversary 1 B such that
Game is identical to 
Finally, we claim that
Since 1/ ( 1) ld q  is negligible, the security of the homomorphic MAC scheme  follows when putting (2), (3), (4) and (5) 
by subtracting (6) from (9), where In this section, we compare our scheme with the one proposed in [9] in terms of the length of key and security level. Note that our tag on a vector v is an ld  matrix over .
F q Therefore, there exists a homomorphic MAC adversary that can break the MAC (i.e. win the attack game) with probability (at least) 1/ .
ld q In fact, our proposed scheme achieves much higher level of security by choosing a larger l while it needs only almost the same length of the key as in [9] . For clarity, we build the following Table I . Since the seed space of a PRG is usually smaller than its range space, the length of seed space of G is shorter than ( ) log . n m d q 
We also choose the PRF F in [13] , which has the property that the range space and secret key space have the same cardinality. Finally, we remark that, in this table, we only consider the last item in (1) as our "standard" of security since it denotes the probability of an adversary trivially breaking the MAC scheme. This is also similar to the consideration of Cheng et al. in [8] .
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a generic homomorphic MAC scheme, which supports multi-file transmission, by directly employing mapping over finite fields. Moreover, our scheme achieves higher level of security than that of Wang et al. but only needs almost the same length of secret key as in [9] .
